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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

SEALED CONTRACT -

TRUSTEE'S AGREEMENT FOR SALE OF REALTY

The recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court case, In Re Commonwealth Trust
Company of Pittsburgh, 54A2 649 (1947), exhibits a departure from the traditional position of the court on the subject of sealed contracts, in a four to three
decision.
In the majority opinion the facts as given are that the Trust Company as
trustee petitioned the Orphans' Court for leave to sell certain real estate, the bid of
the appellant was accepted by the court, and an order was made approving the sale.
The Trust Company and the appellant then executed a sealed writing, adding the
clause, "It is the understanding of the parties hereto that this Agreement covers
property in a Trust Estate and that the Vendor in its fiduciary capacity is legally
obliged to accept any higher or better offer which it receives prior to the approval
of the within sales agreement by the Orphans' Court of Allegheny County, Pa. If the
Vendor receives a higher or better offer than the terms of the within agreement,
it has the right to revoke the within Agreement at any time prior to the consummation of the within sale and to refund the payment made on account of the purchase
price without further liability to the Vendee." The Trust Company did receive a
higher offer, and upon petition the court set aside the earlier order, and entered a
new order approving the sale to the subsequent bidder. The court, in its opinion dismissing the exceptions to the decree, stated that the Act of 1945, P.L. 944, 20 P.S.
sec. 818, 819, was unconstitutional. The act provided that when the court shall approve a contract, neither inadequacy of consideration, nor the receipt of an offer
to deal on other terms, "except as otherwise agreed by the parties" shall constitute
grounds to set it aside, or for refusing to enforce by specific performance or otherwise. While this case was before the lower court, an appeal was pending before the
Supreme Court to a ruling of the same lower court that the Act of 1945 was
unconstitutional: Brereton's Estate 355 Pa. 45 (1946), in which the act was declared constitutional.
The appellant contended in his appeal that the additional provisions of the
writing executed subsequent to the order of the Orphan's Court were without consideration. The Supreme Court upheld this contention in reversing the decree of the
lower court. It stated that equitable title passed upon the entry of the order. When
the Trust Company procured the appellant's signature, "new promises therein
could only be valid and enforceable if supported by legally sufficient consideration." The dissent relies on prior Pennsylvania cases, and reaches a conclusion
which might reasonably be expected until the present case, recalling that the
principle of the seal importing consideration is firmly established, Conrad'sEstate,
333 Pa. 561 (1938), and that in absence of fraud the defense of want to consideration is not available. The majority opinion states that fraud does not appear
in the record.
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The majority opinion states that when the agreement itself reveals the insufficiency or lack of consideration, the rule that the seal imports consideration will
not be applied to the detriment of the promisor. The dissent pointl out that the
case cited for this proposition, Jeffers v. Babis, 304 Pa. 281 (1931), contains the
element of fraud, and otherwise, according to decisions, the fact that no consideration was intended did not invalidate the contract. A sealed promise requires no
consideration.' "Itwill be observed that the instrument is a formal one under seal,
and as such is not merely evidence of the obligation, it is the obligation itself."'
The majority opinion uses a novel construction of the word "agreement" to
support its holding. It states that the legislature intended the word to mean
promises supported by legally sufficient consideration. It seems that there are no
Pennsylvania cases defining the word. The Restatement of Contracts, sec. 3, defines
the word as meaning a manifestation of mutual assent, and comments that the
word contains no implication that legal consequences are or are not to be produced.
Williston on Contracts, p. 5, sec 2, says juristically it is a neutral word, for it covers
promises to which the law attaches no legal or equitable consequences. If our
legislature meant enforceable contracts, it should be assumed to have remembered
the significance of the seal in our law.
The provision is treated as a mistake of fact in the majority and concurring
opinions, and as a mistake of law in the dissent. A mistake of law does not justify
recission. 8 Williston, sec. 1581, p. 4416, remarks that we should obtain uniformity
and certainty by putting both on the same footing. But, as long as our courts preserve the distinction, in their language and in the effect, it would seem that
a misconception as to the constitutionality of a law of the State is as clear a mistake of law as can be found. It is more than possible that the parties were conscious
of the uncertainty of their position, and wished to remove all doubt by taking
the agreement outside its questionable position under the statute, particularly in
front of a court which had ruled on its constitutionality.
The concurring opinion of the Chief Justice states that he agrees with
the majority holding because of the realities of the situation. In his opinion he
cites articles and cases from other jurisdictions which have modified the effects
of the seal, with approval. This case perhaps is the expression of a new conception
of the meaning of the seal in Pennsylvania law.
FRED GALLAGHER
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